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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court entered on 
defendants' post-judgment motions relating to defendants' continuing lease obligations and rights 
and plaintiffs cross-appeal of the district court's order denying its motion for attorneys' fees 
under the lease. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal) 
Issue No. 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Emily Walker 
Trust's ("Walker") Motion for Attorneys' Fees under the Sparks Lease for fees incurred in 
responding to Sparks' Motion? 
Standard of Appellate Review for Issue No. 1: The district court's decision to deny 
attorneys' fees relating to the Sparks' motion is reviewed under a "clear abuse of discretion" 
standard. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1994 (UtahCt. App. 1993). 
Issue No. 2; Whether, after hearing that Sparks had not been provided adequate 
documentation of deficiency amounts and admonishing Walker to provide such documentation 
in the future, the district court abused its discretion in denying Walker's claim for attorneys' fees 
relating to its motion to collect the $921 deficiency? 
Standard of Appellate Review for Issue No. 2: The district court's denial of attorneys' 
fees relating to Walker's motion to collect a deficiency is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal) 
On July 28, 1993, Sparks filed its motion for declaratory relief and for establishment 
of a mechanism to improve efficiency of lease administration during the remaining years of an 
extended lease while protecting Sparks' residual rights and Walker's rights. Walker sought to 
recover attorneys' fees incurred in responding to Sparks' motion under the attorneys' fees clause 
of the Sparks Lease. ROA 808. Sparks responded to this request for fees by explaining that 
the request did not fall within the express wording of the Sparks Lease attorneys' fee provision. 
ROA 831-832. Walker also sought to recover $300 in attorneys' fees expended in filing a 
motion for summary judgment regarding a rent deficiency payment of $921.70. ROA 834. 
At the hearing on these motions on September 24, 1993, the district court rejected 
Walker's requests for attorneys' fees. Sparks explained at length the course of its attempts to 
obtain documentation from Walker showing precisely what deficiency was owed. ROA 896-898, 
900, 907. (A copy of the transcript of the September 24, 1993 hearing is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A.") Following this discussion, the Court agreed that Walker should provide such 
documentation in the future and, because of questions regarding the documentation and the fact 
that Sparks had tendered the payments, denied Walker's request for attorneys' fees. ROA 907-
908. The district court also denied Walker's request for fees relating to Sparks' motions because 
it felt the motions were post-judgment requests for remedies. ROA 905. Walker filed its Notice 
of Cross-Appeal relating to these attorneys' fees issues on November 22, 1993. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
(Limited to Issues on Cross-Appeal) 
Walker has failed to provide any convincing reason for disturbing the district court's 
discretion in denying both of Walker's requests for attorneys' fees. Walker's request for fees 
in responding to Sparks' motion does not fall within the specific terms of the Sparks Lease 
attorney fee provision. Additionally, as the Court noted, it pertains to a post-judgment remedy. 
And, in appealing the district court's denial of attorneys' fees associated with its motion for 
summary judgment, Walker ignores the lengthy discussion at the hearing regarding Walker's 
failure to provide Sparks with documentation of the monthly deficiencies for which it requested 
payment. In fact, the Court's denial of the attorneys' fee request accompanied its oral direction 
to Walker to promptly supply such information to Sparks in the future. In short, the district 
court properly exercised its discretion in denying both requests. 
ARGUMENT 
Sections I, II and III below pertain to issues arising from Sparks' appeal. Sections IV and 
V pertain to issues raised in Walker's Cross-Appeal. 
I. WALKER HAS IGNORED THE PURPOSE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF AND 
CONFUSED THE MEANING OF RIPENESS, 
Walker's objection to Sparks' appeal regarding excess rents rests primarily on the fact 
that the excess rents have not yet been paid, even though there is a current legal obligation to 
pay them. In essence, Walker argues that because the money is not yet in hand, though it must 
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be paid, Sparks' request is "prospective, speculative and remote/'1 Walker's brief, P. 10. 
Walker's argument, however, confuses the purpose of declaratory relief actions and ignores Utah 
case law granting declaratory relief regarding future lease rights. 
As Sparks noted in its opening brief, the purpose of declaratory relief is to enable 
parties to resolve uncertainty and controversy before trouble developed or harm occurred. Salt 
Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1977). However, the controversy must 
be actual or there must be "a substantial likelihood that one will develop . . . ." Id. at 121. In 
support of its argument, Walker recites a litany of speculative possibilities which would affect 
only the amount paid but not the substitute tenant's legal obligation to make the payments. 
However, if Walker's argument were accepted, then declaratory relief would only be available 
to remedy a situation after the fact. Such an action would no longer be one for declaratory 
relief, but would be one for the recovery of amounts owed but unpaid. In essence, Walker's 
interpretation of declaratory relief would strip it of much of its utility in cases where legal duties 
and rights are fixed though the harm has yet to occur. Utah case law plainly rejects such an 
interpretation. 
It is difficult in addressing this issue to overlook the acerbic tone of Walker's brief. 
Walker goes so far as to claim that Sparks' position is not only "utterly without merit," but 
also "advanced solely for the purpose of causing delay." Walker's brief, p. 8. Suggesting 
that Sparks' argument is without merit flatly ignores Utah case law and the purpose of 
declaratory relief. And, Walker's unfounded claim that Sparks has appealed this issue for 
purposes of delay is offensive. These claims and other inflammatory comments in 
Walker's brief are addressed in some detail in Section III below. 
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In Kapetenov v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that declaratory judgments "provide the means of resolving 
uncertainties and controversies before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs 
are committed." (emphasis in original) The court further noted that, contrary to Walker's 
suggestion, "no actual wrong or loss need exist in order to sustain an action for declaratory 
judgment." Id. In the present case, the only fact remaining unknown is the actual amount paid 
by the substitute tenant. However, neither party can dispute that the substitute tenant is under 
a legally enforceable obligation to make those payments when due and that the parties contest 
how those payments should be applied. Utah courts have previously held that disputed future 
obligations or rights under current leases are an appropriate subject of declaratory relief. 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 596 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1979). 
In other situations, the Utah Supreme Court has also granted declaratory relief even though 
the rights at issue are contingent on future conduct. In Sanpete County Water Conservancy Dist. 
v. Price River Water Users Assoc., 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982), the defendants argued that 
no justiciable controversy existed because "the contractual water rights which form the basis of 
plaintiffs applications are contingent on construction of the Gooseberry Project, which 
construction has not begun and may never take place." The defendants claimed the issues were 
therefore "hypothetical" or "abstract in nature." Id. The Supreme Court rejected defendants' 
argument, holding that "a justiciable controversy does not depend on a showing that the opposing 
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interests giving rise to the controversy are perfected or immediately exercisable." Id.; See also, 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748, 751 (1944). 
Finally, Walker attempts to argue that the district court could have denied Sparks' 
motion as a matter of discretion. However, whether the district court could have exercised such 
discretion in the present case is irrelevant, because the district court decided that the issue was 
not yet justiciable or ripe. ROA 860, 905. Determinations of justiciability and ripeness go to 
the Court's jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 
917, 191 (Utah 1993); Baird v. Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978). Having decided that the 
controversy was not ripe, .the district specifically stated that it was not reaching the merits of 
Sparks' request. ROA 904-905. How the district court would have exercised its discretion if 
it felt it had jurisdiction to do so is completely speculative and irrelevant. 
In conclusion, Sparks presented a ripe and justiciable issue for declaratory relief. In 
arguing otherwise, Walker ignores the parties' and substitute tenant's current lease obligations 
and relevant Utah law, choosing instead to rely on speculative and irrelevant circumstances 
affecting only the amount of the obligation. The district erred as a matter of law in deciding the 
issue was not ripe. And, as explained in Sparks opening brief, the excess rent should be applied 
to reduce the total deficiency under the Sparks Lease. 
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H. IN OBJECTING TO SPARKS' ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A MORE EFFICIENT 
MECHANISM FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPARKS LEASE. WALKER 
RELIES ON MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF SPARKS' REQUESTED RELIEF 
AND FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COURT'S 
ERRONEOUS LEGAL RULINGS, 
In order to assess the merits of Sparks' appeal on this issue, it is important to recognize 
(1) the limited relief Sparks was asking for and (2) the basis of the district court's decision. 
Walker, in mischaracterizmg Sparks' requested relief, fails to address the permissibility of the 
relief Sparks was actually seeking. And, Walker fails to recognize that the district court's 
decision was framed by its misunderstanding of the parties' status. When viewed accurately, 
the relief Sparks actually sought properly acknowledges and protects the rights of both parties, 
increases efficiency in the post-judgment administration of long-term leases and consequently 
reduces inequity. 
Throughout its brief, Walker repeatedly suggests that Sparks is seeking a full assignment 
of the lease of any substitute tenant placed in the premises. This creates the impression, and is 
even suggested by Walker, that Sparks seeks physical control of the premises and supervision 
of the substitute tenant. Walker relies on this mischaracterization and overstatement in an effort 
to prove that Sparks' proposed relief is inequitable and legally unjustifiable. However, as Sparks 
has frequently explained, the relief it seeks is highly limited and specifically focussed to protect 
the parties' rights and increase the efficiency of post-judgment administration of long-term 
leases. The relief Sparks seeks, rather than what Walker describes, is legally permissible, 
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appropriate and consistent with the objectives the Utah Supreme Court sought to further in Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha, 776 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1989). 
The relief Sparks seeks is clear from the record. In its Reply Memorandum filed with the 
district court, Sparks explained that it sought "limited procedural relief" under which Walker 
"would still retain control of the substitute lease and be responsible for insuring the substitute 
tenant's compliance with other lease terms." ROA 827, 830.2 Again, at the hearing, Sparks 
repeatedly explained that it sought only to pursue monetary defaults of the substitute tenant after 
Walker had a reasonable time to collect and have responsibility for retaining, with Walker's 
approval, and directly paying a broker. ROA 886-888, 890-891. Finally, in its opening brief 
in this appeal, Sparks explained the limited nature of the relief it sought. Brief of the Appellant, 
pp. 17, 22-23. 
Sparks sought this relief for two interrelated purposes. First, Sparks believed the procedure 
established in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha did not protect its residual rights as lessee under a valid 
lease to ensure full utilization of the premises. Second, Sparks believed the established 
procedure was inequitable for reasons explained in its Brief of the Appellant (pp. 22-23) and its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Assign Lease and for Declaratory Relief. ROA 789-791. 
In its initial brief filed with the district court on July 28, 1993, Sparks requested a full 
assignment; however, by the time Sparks filed its Reply Memorandum it had tailored its 
requested relief more carefully to further its dual objective. 
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Sparks recognized that the outcome of its motion might hinge on a legal determination of 
what residual rights it possessed and of the potential inequity of the current procedure. The 
district court recognized the significance of this issue as well. In one exchange between the 
court and Sparks' local counsel at the hearing, Sparks' local counsel responded to a question 
from the court regarding Utah authority on this issue by stating "I don't think the issue has come 
before Utah appellate courts as to exactly what - I mean, there's Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, 
which establishes sort of the broad features of how this procedure is to be established; but I 
don't know that they ever directly address exactly what the residual rights of a defaulting tenant 
are." The district court then responded M[a]nd I think that's exactly the issue." ROA 890. 
The district court then assessed what rights, if any, Sparks had. The district court made 
that assessment under the belief that the Sparks Lease was terminated and the Judgment awarded 
Walker possession of the premises.3 It seems obvious that a court will consider the existence 
and nature of a tenant's residual rights differently when the lease is terminated and possession 
awarded to the landlord than when the lease is still in effect. This distinction colored the district 
court's application of the law to the facts of this case, as noted in the excerpt from the district 
court's comments quoted in Sparks opening brief on appeal, p. 21. In fact, the district court 
3
 Walker disputes whether the portion of the district court's order stating that Walker had 
been awarded possession of the premises may be addressed on appeal. However, Walker's 
argument is not appropriate to the circumstances involved here. Rather, cases addressing 
the appeal of a court's findings of fact and conclusions of law or the judgment are 
applicable. As to such errors, an objection need not be filed with the trial court before 
appeal. Dugan v. Jones, 114 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986). 
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acknowledged that Sparks' proposal might be more efficient and better for the parties; however, 
it believed it had no authority to award the relief. ROA 900-905. 
Although the district court's misunderstanding of the facts framed its legal analysis of 
Sparks' rights, Walker argues that the district court's misunderstanding was irrelevant because 
(1) the Sparks Lease barred Sparks from protecting its interests in the manner requested, and (2) 
the district court had broad discretion to deny Sparks' motion. However, the Sparks Lease, like 
other leases, is subject to certain common law rights. And, in any event, the requested relief 
is consistent with the relief provided in Article 46. Finally, as with the motion regarding 
declaratory relief, it is speculative to guess how the district court would have exercised its 
discretion if it felt it had the option. 
Although leases are partially contractual in nature, they are still subject to principles which 
the parties apparently are not at complete liberty to ignore. For instance, the right to dispossess 
a tenant without notice or legal process and seize its property is of questionable validity. 
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1275 n. 5 (Utah 1982); see also, Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 
1006, 1018 (Utah 1991) (per Durham, J. with Zimmerman, J., concurring). In fact, Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha demonstrates that Article 46 is subject, like any other lease provision, to 
general principles of common law. The bare wording of Article 46 grants Walker the right to 
rent or not rent on any terms its chooses "in its sole discretion/' In addition, Article 46 does 
not mandate mitigation as an obligation of the landlord but simply permits reletting at the 
landlord's discretion. Neither party in this lawsuit has contested that these portions of Article 
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46 are subject to Reid's requirement that the landlord must actively mitigate its loss in a 
commercially reasonable fashion. Because Article 46 is subject to these limitations, it would 
also be subject to a similar mechanism that would more effectively protect the lessee's interest 
without infringing the lessor's right to receive all to which the lease entitles it. As explained 
in Sparks' opening brief, Sparks' requested relief, as opposed to Walker's mischaracterization 
of it, fulfills this objective ensuring protection of the landlord's recovery and reducing economic 
waste.4 
In addition, the limited relief Sparks requests does not run afoul of Article 46. Sparks has 
requested the right to receive notice of monetary defaults and to pursue the defaulting tenant for 
the deficiency. Accordingly, the costs and burdens attendant to such litigation are borne by 
Sparks rather than Walker.5 Pursuing the monetary default of substitute tenants is consistent 
Sparks' relief is also consistent with, and efficiently promotes, several of the Supreme 
Court's objectives in Reid. In Reid, the court recognized that "the economies of both the 
state and nation benefit from a rule that encourages the reletting of premises, which returns 
them to productive use, rather than permitting a landlord to let them sit idle while it seeks 
rents from the breaching tenant." 776 P.2d at 905. As a result, the supreme court 
established its procedure in an attempt to "insure that serious efforts are made to redeploy 
the rental property in a productive fashion . . .." Id. 
The relevant portion of Article 46 provides as follows: 
Should Lessor elect to re-enter . . . [it may] relet said premises or any part 
thereof for such term of [sic] terms . . . and at such rental or rentals and upon 
such other terms and conditions as Lessor in its sole discretion may deem it 
advisable; upon each such reletting all rentals received by the Lessor for such 
reletting shall be applied, first to the payment of any indebtedness other than rent 
due from Lessee to Lessor; second, to the payment of any costs and expenses 
(continued...) 
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with Article 46 in that Sparks would be directly assuming the attorneys fees otherwise paid by 
Walker, would be making the full monthly rental payments due under the Sparks Lease to 
Walker and would offset against that amount any recovery from the defaulting tenant. As a 
result, Walker would not be deprived of anything it is entitled to under Article 46 and would, 
in fact, be spared the necessity of initial outlays for attorneys fees, other expenses and delays 
in payment. Walker would achieve similar benefits by Sparks' directly retaining and paying a 
broker.6 Accordingly, the limited relief Sparks seeks is not inconsistent with Article 46. 
Walker next argues that the district court's decision was not an abuse of its discretion. 
However, the correctness of the district court's determination of the law applicable to the facts 
is reviewed under a standard between correctness of error and abuse of discretion. Utah v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1993). As noted above, by applying the law to the facts as it 
understood them, the district court believed it would violate the landlord's legal rights to grant 
5(... continued) 
of such reletting, including brokerage fees and attorneys fees and costs of such 
alterations and repairs; third, to the payment of any rent due and unpaid 
hereunder, and the the [sic] residue, if any, shall be held by Lessor and applied 
in payment of future rent as the same may become due and payable hereunder. 
6
 In addition, the requested relief would not infringe on Walker's right to relet the premises. 
Walker's right to relet under Article 46 is currently subject to the requirements of Reid. 
Although the relief Sparks requests poses no greater infringement than Reid, it is more 
efficient and fairer to Sparks' interests. As Sparks has requested, Sparks would retain and 
pay a broker and could monitor its efforts. Walker would also consult with the broker and 
would approve and contract directly with any substitute tenant the broker locates. In the 
interim, Sparks would be paying the monthly lease payments. 
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Sparks' relief even though it acknowledged the appeal and potential benefits of the procedure 
that Sparks proposed. ROA 900-905. This understanding of the facts, and the applicable law, 
was in error. 
Walker downplays the significance of the district court's misunderstanding regarding 
termination of the lease and a judgment of possession. However, both facts are critical to how 
the judge applied the law in this case. A primary issue in Sparks' motion involved the nature 
and extent of its residual rights. Because the district court considered the Sparks Lease 
terminated and possession awarded to Walker, it was not likely to find any residual rights left. 
Had the court been aware that the lease will still in effect and possession had never been 
awarded to Walker, it may have reached a different conclusion. In fact, by applying the law 
to the facts as it understood them, the district court felt itself bound to rule in the manner it did. 
ROA 902-905. 
In conclusion, Sparks sought limited relief in order to preserve its residual rights, honor 
the landlord's rights and increase the efficiency of the judgment's operation during the coming 
eight years. In denying Sparks' request, the district court had an incorrect understanding of 
critical facts and felt itself obligated to deny the relief as violative of the landlord's legal rights. 
However, recognizing that a defaulting tenant liable under a nonterminated long-term lease 
retains residual rights to ensure the full utilization of the premises, Sparks' motion was not 
contrary to the applicable law or lease provisions. Accordingly, the district court's decision 
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should be reversed, the residual rights of the defaulting tenant should be recognized and the case 
remanded to the district court to enter an order consistent with the law and facts. 
m. WALKER'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IS INFLAMMATORY AND 
UNFOUNDED. 
After reviewing Walker's opening brief, we were left to wonder what in our appeal 
sparked such a vitriolic attack, at times bordering on unsupported ad hominum argument. The 
acerbic and inflammatory tone of Walker's brief as a whole and specifically its Rule 33 request 
makes a dispassionate response difficult. The initial inclination is to meet hostility in kind; 
however, as the Utah Supreme Court noted, "vitriol is expensive these days . . . what with the 
spiraling cost of professional medication." Carroll v. Birdsall, 24 Utah 2d 411, 473 P.2d 398, 
401 (1970). As explained below, and simply put, Walker's Rule 33 request is without factual 
support and without assistance from Utah case law. 
Walker provides no support for its fully speculative accusation that Sparks brought this 
appeal solely for purposes of delay. Walker relies entirely on a sanction entered at the trial 
court level; however, Walker provides no indication that this appeal was brought for any 
improper purpose. In making its unfounded allegation of delay, Walker completely fails to 
mention that it is receiving all deficiency payments due under the Sparks Lease and that Sparks 
requested no stay in connection with this appeal and the district court has granted no stay. As 
a result, the appeal has no effect on Walker receiving in a timely manner all the relief it was 
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granted under the judgment. Accordingly, Walker's allegation of delay, and the thinly veiled 
implication of bad faith, appears to constitute little more than gamesmanship. 
Aside from delay, attorneys' fees and costs under Utah R. App. P. 33 may be 
awarded only where the appeal is "frivolous." Rule 33 defines a frivolous claim as "one that 
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good-faith argument 
to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." As this Court has recently noted, "'sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling 
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.'" In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 
971, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), quoting, Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Even a "strained reading" of the relevant law does not constitute an egregious case 
unless "all competent counsel would recognize the arguments made on appeal are without merit." 
Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The issues Sparks raises on appeal are hardly strained and far from egregious. In the 
case of Sparks' request for declaratory relief, Sparks seeks reversal of the district court's 
erroneous assessment of the issue's ripeness. Far from being a strained interpretation of the 
law, Sparks' argument is actually supported both by the Utah Supreme Court's express 
declarations of the purpose of declaratory relief as well as its previous case law regarding future 
lease rights. See, Section I above. Walker's suggestion that this argument is "utterly without 
merit" or interposed for the purposes of delay is unfounded and troubling. 
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In its attempt to obtain a more efficient procedure for administering future long-term 
lease obligations following entry of judgment, Sparks admittedly seeks the Court's assistance in 
clarifying or expanding on Utah law in areas where it is either silent or inadequate. Sparks has 
never argued otherwise. Before the district court, Sparks' counsel repeatedly acknowledged an 
absence of Utah case law regarding the rights of which it sought recognition. ROA 885-886, 
889-890. Although the district court acknowledged that the procedure Sparks proposed may be 
more efficient than the one established under Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, the district court felt 
that as a matter of law it could not grant such relief. ROA 900-905. This appeal, seeking 
resolution from Utah's appellate courts of the correctness of the district court's understanding 
of the law, is hardly without merit. And, it is precisely the type of claim as to which the 
imposition of sanctions would have a chilling effect. The clarification of the rights of defaulting 
tenants under long-term commercial leases is one of considerable economic significance in Utah. 
An attempt to seek clarification of Utah law in this area or an expansion of a tenant's rights can 
hardly be deemed frivolous. 
In short, Sparks has not brought this appeal for any improper purpose but has sought 
both a reversal of the district court's erroneous legal interpretation and a recognition of any 
residual rights it may have under Utah law in the context of a long-term commercial lease. 
Walker's in terrorem approach to responding to Sparks' appeal is an unjustifiable litigation 
tactic. As Sparks' appeal is neither frivolous nor brought for an improper purpose, Walker's 
Rule 33 request should be denied. 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ASSOCIATED 
WITH SPARKS' MOTION. 
At the district court level, Walker claimed that, under Article 46 of the Sparks Lease, 
it was entitled to its attorneys' fees related to opposing Sparks' post-judgment motions. Walker 
appeals the district court's denial of its request for attorneys' fees solely on the basis of the 
district court's statement that the Sparks Lease was terminated. Walker, however, wholly 
ignores and is silent regarding the wording of the Order it drafted and the wording of Article 
46, both of which firmly support the district court's decision. 
Under Utah law, attorneys' fees are only awarded where they are provided for by 
contract or by statute or as a legitimate item of damages resulting from wrongful conduct. 
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980). Where there is a 
contract, attorneys' fees are only awarded in accordance with the contract's terms. Equitable 
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied, 860 
P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). And, a district court's decision regarding an award of attorneys' fees 
will only be overturned on a "clear abuse of discretion." Id. 
In the present case, the district court's order states that Walker's first request for 
attorneys' fees "although arising out of the Lease, arises out of post-judgment requests for 
remedies and therefore is denied." (emphasis added) The Sparks Lease, out of which Walker's 
17 
request arises, expressly defines the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are recoverable. 
Sparks' post-judgment motions at issue in this appeal do not fall within the terms of Article 46.7 
Although Walker expends much energy in its brief addressing the district court's 
erroneous belief that the Sparks Lease was terminated, it makes no mention at all of how its 
request falls within the terms of Article 46. Sparks' post-judgment motions, on the other hand, 
sought to establish a more efficient mechanism for administering the judgment while preserving 
the parties' rights and to obtain declaratory relief regarding the status of future excess rents. 
Unlike the situations contemplated and listed in Article 46, Sparks' post-judgment motions did 
not request a finding that one party was "defaulting" or recovery from a defaulting party. 
In sum, although the district court may have been incorrect in its belief that the Sparks 
Lease was terminated, Walker excluded that part of the court's statement in the order it drafted 
and the district court signed. Walker's wording states only that the request arose out of the 
Sparks Lease and involved post-judgment requests for remedies. And, Walker has made 
absolutely no showing that it would be entitled to attorneys' fees under Article 46 of the Sparks 
The relevant portion of Article 46, entitled "Default of Lessee," provides: 
In case of suit shall be brought for recovery of possession of the 
leased premises, for the recovery of rent or any other amount 
due under the provisions of this Lease, or because of the breach 
of any other covenant herein contained on the part of the Lessee 
to be kept or performed, and a breach shall be established, that 
defaulting [sic] shall pay to the other party all expenses incurred 
therefor, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
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Lease. As such, it has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion. Its appeal 
regarding the district court's denial of attorneys' fees relating to Sparks' post-judgment motions 
should therefore be denied. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES ASSOCIATED 
WITH ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Walker appeals the district court's denial of its request for $300 in attorneys' fees 
associated with its Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a cumulative deficiency of $921.70. 
As Walker acknowledges, the payment was tendered to Walker at the hearing. However, 
Walker wholly ignores the court's consideration of the fact, following lengthy discussion, that 
payment was delayed due to Walker's failure to provide adequate documentation. After hearing 
the explanation of both parties, the court denied Walker's fee request and directed Walker to 
provide adequate documentation to Sparks in the future if it expected prompt payments. In light 
of the full record, the district court's decision hardly constitutes a "clear abuse of discretion" 
or "patent error." 
At the hearing, the court asked Sparks why monthly deficiencies under the Sparks 
Lease had not been paid earlier. A lengthy discussion followed, focussing almost exclusively 
on the fact that Walker never provided Sparks with requested documentation so that it could 
calculate and verify the deficiency. ROA 896-898, 900, 906-908. Sparks' corporate counsel, 
Brian Wanca, informed the coun that Sparks never received documentation verifying what the 
19 
substitute tenants were actually paying each month and that, when Sparks requested the 
information, Walker's response was to file a motion for summary judgment. ROA 907. 
After hearing Sparks' explanation and Walker's response, the district court stated 
"that's one of the reasons is at this point I understand there's some dispute about that, and that's 
why I'm not going to award any attorneys' fees and costs at this time." ROA 907. He then 
informed Walker's counsel "I would think you ought to advise your client that the Court has 
made this ruling that the information be supplied - excuse me - promptly, if your client wants 
prompt payment." ROA 908.8 The district court also stated that in the future it would not 
hesitate to award attorneys' fees against any party dilatory in fulfilling either the obligation to 
provide documentation or to make timely payment. ROA 907. 
In short, Walker attempts to meet its burden of proving an abuse of discretion by 
ignoring the context of the district court's decision. The district court reached its decision 
following an extended discussion of Walker's failure to provide Sparks with the documentation 
it requested. Following that discussion, the district court denied Walker's request for attorneys' 
fees and directed it to provide such documentation to Sparks in the future. As such, the district 
court's decision was highly appropriate and merits affirmation. 
Earlier in the hearing, the district court stated that the "landlord clearly has a duty to 
provide to the defaulting tenant information which will give that information on - or give 
that tenant a correct, honest and rather prompt picture of what the status of the lease is . 
. .." ROA 902-903. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Sparks requests the following relief regarding issues raised 
by Walker: 
1. Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals deny Walker's Rule 33 request. 
2. As to the district court's denial of attorneys' fees arising from Sparks' motion, 
Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the district court's decision. 
3. As to the district court's denial of Walker's request for attorneys' fees associated 
with its motion for summary judgment, Sparks requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the 
district court's decision. 
DATED this f2— day of August, 1994. 
Stanford B. OAVen 
John D>. Ray 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 I THE COURT: Down to Maaco Enterprises, 
4 Emily Walker Trust. 
5 MR. POOLE: Your Honor, Dennis Poole for 
6 the plaintiff. 
7 MR. RAY: Jack Ray for the defendants, 
g your Honor, 
9 MR. POOLE: Your Honor, I think that there 
10 I are three motions here, and I think that the motions of the 
defendant probably should go first, that's with respect to 
the assignment of the lease. Our motions are for summary 
judgment and attorney's fees; 
24 I THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed. 
15 MR. RAY: Thank you. 
K5 In defendants' motion, they seek basically two 
17 things. One is a mechanism to increase the efficiency of the 
18 judgment's operation over the next eight years, and the 
19 second is a declaration regarding excess rents which are 
20 going to be paid in later years under a lease with the 
2i I substitute tenants. 
We are not seeking to reduce or delay our obliga-
tions under the lease. We're not seeking to relitigate this 
case or the issues that were raised at trial; all we're 
attempting to do is improve the efficiency of the judgment's 
2 
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2 At present, the deficiency between the amount 
» I 
3 which would have been owing under the Sparks lease, so-
4 called Sparks lease, and the amount under the substitute 
5 lease, is only about 150 to $200 a month, but the total 
6 exposure of the defendants over the next eight years i s — 
7 exceeds $200,000. So, it's—these issues are rather 
g significant to the defendants, and the whole purpose of 
9 I this is to attempt to obtain a procedure which will protect 
the defendants' rights and preserve the plaintiff's rights 





And I have set forth a number of explanations in 
my memoranda regarding how it would do that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I've seen them. 
MR. RAY: If vou'd like me to repeat 
IQ I those or explain them further, I can. 
y i J THE COURT: Well, I think you need not. 
2g I I understand your position and I've looked at the chart 
19 that—that corporate counsel's prepared and—and understand 






MR. RAY: Okay. I think, over the 
course of the past couple of weeks, the defendants and the 
plaintiff have—have been attempting to negotiate the 
establishment of a mechanism which would laraely satisfy the 
concerns, I believe, of both parties. And essentially, those 
3 
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are to establish a mechanism whereby the defendants would 
be able to know on a monthly basis whether the rent's being 
paid and how much, so that they would be immediately aware 
of any default, and exactly how much the monthly deficiency 
which is owing is. And in the event of a default, so that 
they could be able to pursue any monetary default against 
the substitute tenant. That would relieve the—the plaintiff 
of the burden of pursuing such an action for rent deficiency. 
THE COURT: Let—let m e — I — I want to 
get something straight in my mind, because I read through 
t h i s — 
MR. RAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: I read through all these 
documents last evening and then when I got home, it dawned 
on me that I had a question. 
As I recall, the way—the posture in which this 
case was last left when I applied my fine, Italian hand to 
it, was that the—all right, now I'm mixed up on parties— 
yeah, that the plaintiff, in effect, had reclaimed the 
shopping center, and it was now in the—it was in the 
position, in order to meet its obligation under Utah law of 
mitigating damages, of re-leasing the premises at the best 
commercial rate available, applying that to the agreed 
rental, and if there's any deficiency, then of course that 
becomes a deficiency against your client; if there is none, 
4 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)2664)320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64107 
1 then the surplusage after the payment of any judgments and 
2 - soon would go back to your client- is that not the status 
I that we find ourselves in? 
4 | MR. RAY: It is, except for that last— 
5 , your last phrase, I believe, is probably still at issue if I 
6 I understand the position of the plaintiff, and that would be 
7 as to what the—the disposition of the surplus rent would be, 
8 It's our position that that should be paid back to 
9 the defendants in this case as mitigation of the previous 
damages which the plaintiffs have—have experienced, 
u I THE COURT: Yeah. That's the key 
question. You've got the—you've got the point, you're 
negative, you hit neutral, you start into a positive 
position; does the future positive get applied to past 
negative? 
MR. RAY: I believe—I believe there's 
Utah— 
THE COURT: Right? I don't know. But 
for the moment—we'll get to that— 
MR. RAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: —but for the moment, as a 
matter of legal vesting, if you want to use that terminology, 
the landlord currently is Emily Walker Trust. 
MR. RAY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And they are leasing that 
5 
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and conditions of the decree here—I mean, the—the—the 
3 J legal ramifications of the—of the lease and the receipt of 
4 income for that leasing, are governed by the terms of t h i s — 
5 of this decree and the applicable law; that is, the appli-
6 cation against the amount due from your client, had they not 
7 breached their lease. Right? 
8 MR. RAY: Yes. They—yeah, they have an 
9 J obligation to mitigate their damages by releasinq— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. RAY: — t h e premises in a commercially 
reasonable fashion. 
"frHE COURT: Okay. Nov;, so your client 
has no legal claim whatsoever to occupancy or possession of 
the premises. 
MR. RAY: Well, I believe that's really 
an open question under the law where we've paid all of the 
rent and we're still under the hook to pay the rent and 
satisfy all of those monetary obligations, exactly what our 
rights are in relation to preserving the future occupancv and 
payment of rent by substitute tenants under the premises. 




MR. RAY: So, I—I don't know that 
there's any Utah law directly on point on that issue; but 
I think that's kind of what the gist of this motion is, is to 
6 
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try and preserve whatever rights the defendants have t o — 
THE COURT: Yeah, well, that%s exactly 
what—that's what I'm trying to analyze here. And it seems 
to me that your position, and I'll just.say this to get 
ideas—get a—a idea of the respective positions. Your 
position is that because your client is in effect obligated 
to at least make up any deficiency between the rental 
actually received and that which would have been received had 
the lease continued, therefore, your client would like to 
have, and you say, I think, has a right to have assigned to 
it the lease or the lessor's interest in that lease and— 
together with all the responsibilities thereunder. 
MR. RAY: Yeah. That's an initial 
position, your Honor. We recognize that there may be an 
alternate remedy which would satisfy our concerns without an 
absolute assignment of all rights under the substitute 
lease. 
THE COURT: And what would that be? 
MR. RAY: Well, the—the proposal which 
has been discussed with—with Mr. Poole has been that the 
landlord, the managing agent, would provide us with a 
monthly affidavit within, you know, five days or a week 
after the rental payment from the substitute tenant is due 
indicating the rent paid, whether there's been a default, 
and attaching a copy of the check. That would provide us 
7 
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first with an indication of whether there's a default and 
what our obligation is. 
Second, if there has been a default, the landlord 
would be provided with a reasonable opportunity to get the 
substitute tenant to cure the default. In the event that it 
is not cured and the default is monetary in nature, then we 
would be assigned the right to pursue the substitute tenant 
for the deficiency and evict him from the premises. 
Now, that would relieve the landlord of the 
obligation of doing that. In the meantime, we would be 
making all of the monthly payments directly to the landlord, 
so there would be no gap in them receiving everything that 
they're entitled to under the Sparks lease. 
It would allow us to—not to have to quibble with 
them over how they're pursuing the litigation against the 
substitute tenant, whether their attorney's fees in that 
litigation are reasonable because we would be fronting and 
pursuing all of those burdens, ourselves. 
Also, if the substitute tenant is evicted, then we 
would retain a broker with—you know, who would be approved 
by the landlord, and we would be consulting with that broker 
for the establishment of a substitute tenant who they would, 
you know, obviously within standards of commercial reasonable-
ness, have the opportunity to approve, because it's their 
shopping center. 
8 
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1 That would— 
2 THE COURT: I~the~the thing that's 
3 driving this idea, I take it, is because that under the 
4 arrangement with the Gasperinis, there will be a surplusage 
5 over the amount your clients' obligated to pay as the term 
6 of the lease runs. 
7 MR. RAY: That's—that's one issue, your 
8 Honor, but that—that surplusage is only abour $7,500. I 
9 think the larger issue is knowing exactly how much rent is 
10 being received from the substitute tenant, and being able to 
11 pursue a deficiency and then hire a broker, so that we're 
12 satisfied that somebody is getting in there as quickly as 
13 possible, because our total exposure under this lease is far 
14 greater than the surplusage is, even though that's— 
15 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Certainlv. 
16 MR. RAY: — a n issue. 
17 THE COURT: Certainly. 
18 MR. RAY: So, we want to—we want to do 
19 that without having to come back into Court, you know, 
20 wondering whether the—the broker has been retained in a 
2i timely fashion, whether he's been working hard. Since it 
22 would be our broker, we wouldn't be able to come back into 
23 Court and claim that they haven't been—been seeking to 
24 mitigate their damages or acting in a commercially reasonable 
25 fashion. 
9 
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THE COURT: So, you have two benefits. 
One, you don't have to come back in and raise a claim 
against the trust, that they failed to properly mitigate, 
really. 
MR. RAY: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And secondly, any—any 
benefit of additional or higher rentals that could be 
obtained, whether by reason that the Gasperinis stay in the 
premises—I guess they're out, is that— 
MR. RAY: There has been—I'm not exactly 
clear what the current status of the property is, but I 
think they're— 
THE COURT: Well, whatever; but i f — i f — 
if they or some other tenant paid more rental in the future 
than your client would be obligated to do, then your client 
would get the benefit of that. I mean, that's the position 
you—you want? 
MR. RAY: That's our position, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Do you have any—when I read your—I read your 
briefs, I didn't get the impression that you had any Utah law 
that said that under the well-established, and I think it's 
almost universal, principle, that a landlord has a duty to 
mitigate its damages. That where a situation such as this, 
a relatively long-term lease, is in effect, that the former 
10 
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j tenant, now found to be a defaulting tenant, has a right to 
2 an assignment of the landlord's leasing rights, in effect, 
3 I think that's really what we're talking about, and a right 
4 I to, in effect, control the property as a—as a tenant with 
5 a subtenant. 
6 MR. RAY: Yeah. 
7 THE COURT: I just don't—1 didn't see 
g J that you had any cases that I thought said that there's 
clearly a right that the tenant has, 
MR. PAY: Yeah, I don't think the issue 
has come before a Utah appellate court as to exactly what— 
I mean, there's Reid vs. Mutual of Omaha, which establishes 
sort of the broad features of how this procedure is to be 
established; but I don't know that they ever directly address 
exactly what the residual rights of a defaulting tenant are. 
THE COURT: And I think that's exactly 
the issue. 
MR. RAY: And I think here, you know, 
even if it weren't an absolute assignment, you know, there 
is a mechanism which the Court does have equitable power 
under, it's continuing jurisdiction or under Rule 60(b) to 
establish, which would preserve all of the landlord's rights 
and preserve the landlord's control of the property, really* 
All we're talking about are the monetary obliga-
tions of the substitute tenant and pursuing a monetary 
11 
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! default, and then having responsibility for paying a broker 
2 who we would also have the right to consult as would the 
3 landlord. 
4 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
5 MR. RAY: And I think those, you know, 
6 the ability of the Court to do that is—is established. There 
7 isn't a Utah case which expressly deals with the issue, but 
8 I think the Court would have, at the very least, the equitable 
9 I power to do that in order to preserve our interests and our 
rights where we do have an obligation here potentially of 













how—how things are being negotiated with a substitute 
tenant and who's out there and what's being paid and—and i t — 
14 it seems like a more equitable remedy which would simplify 
things, both for the landlord as well as preserving the 
interests of the defendants. 
THE COURT: Well, I see your position. 
I—I—you know, I clearly do. 
MR. RAY: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. RAY: Just if I might touch on one or 
22 two issues, I guess, 
That is in terms of the excess rents, I believe 
there is Utah law which establishes our right and we've 
cited that case in our briefs, to receive that excess rent 
12 
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j as a reduction of our damages, since essentially it results 
2 from the landlord's efforts to mitigate. 
3 The Emily Walker Trust at the trial, as your Honor 
4 may recall, paid a substantial amount in brokerage fees for 
5 placing that substitute tenant in the premises and subsequent 
5 brokerage fees would also be paid for bv us and we believe 
7 that's an additional— 
8 THE COURT: Oh. Yeah, I saw that, 
9 I MR. RAY: —reason for us to be able to 
receive those excess rents. 
Finally, if I might just address, and I suppose 
this is a little out of turn, Mr. Poole's motion for summary 
judgment regarding attorney's fees relating to this 
14 I particular motion. 
15 | THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. We'll 
16 I 9et t o that problem, yeah. 
17 MR. RAY: That might save—save things a 
little bit. 
I believe that under the terms of the lease which 
is referenced in the judgment, that the attornev's fees for 
2i I this particular motion would not be recoverable, that the 
22 attorney's fees clause in the lease concerns itself more 
with the actual "breach by a tenant, the recovery of past due 
rent and that kind of thing. And I believe the remedy we're 
seeking here is something more in the nature of establishing 
13 
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a mechanism for future obligations under the judgment and 
doesn't fall strictly within the terms of that attorney's 
fees provision. 
THE COURT: Okav. 
MR. RAY: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Poole? 
MR. POOLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Your Honor, I won't regurgitate the material in the 
memorandum, but I would like to stress a couple of points, if 
I may. 
I believe that the mechanism is already set forth 
in the Reid case to deal with the issues which have been 
raised by counsel. In the event of future deficiencies, or 
the breach of the existing subtenants, the landlord has a 
continuing duty to mitigate, which is judged in a commercially 
reasonable standard. 
At that time, if in fact there is a deficiencv, we 
would assert the claim against the defendants, Sparks and 
Maaco, and we would have to establish commercially reasonable 
standards and efforts to mitigate it. 
The Reid case clearly says that we look at matters 
occurring to that date. We don't make any future—or give 
any future credits for rents that might be paid. The very 
analysis and reasoning of the Reid case was, we don't 
14 
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2 For that reason, we don't believe that this Court 
3 should or can, for that matter, rule that future rents would 
4 be subject to a credit or offset based upon what's been paid 
5 to date. There haven't been any excess rents paid. 
6 Admittedly, under the terms of the Gasperini 
7 lease commenced in, I think, in January of '94, there might 
8 be, and it's only that, there might be excess rents; 
9 unfortunately, the Gasperinis are in default, they are no 
20 I longer in possession of the property, another lease has been 
entered into, which I believe to be on substantially 
identical financial terms. 
23 I With respect to the assignment issue or something 
24 akin to an assignment of this sublease, the problem we see, 
15 your Honor, is an issue of control. One of the requested 
reliefs—or claims or relief that we obtained from this Court 
27 I was possession of the property, and with that possession, 
18 goes the right to select tenants within the confines of the 
29 law, being commercially reasonable, we have the right to 
20 J administer that lease, we have the right to, you know, 
basically dictate the management of that property. And by 
virtue of trying to assign the benefits of the sublease to 
23 I Sparks and Maaco, I think we lose some of those particular 
24 J rights. 
Sparks and Maaco, I believe, might be interested 
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1 solely in the monetary aspects of this lease, or the per-
2 formance of the subtenant o r — y e t , our interests are, I 
3 think? much more extensive. We're concerned about insurance 
4 and use clauses and waste and things of that nature. And I 
5 think if we make a partial assignment, we have some 
5 confusion before the Court as to who's going to enforce 
7 this; what if we want to evict, they don't want to evict. 
8 It simply, I think, raises additional conflict 
9 a n d — a n d problems for the Court, which we'll be back here 
10 asking this Court to resolve. I think we should stay with 
H the mechanism which the Supreme Court has given us. 
12 Your. Honor, in terms of the attorney's fees issue, 
23 I believe that we are entitled to attorney's fees relative 
24 to resisting this motion. This motion, this entire contro-
25 versy arises out of the breach of the lease agreement and 
2G trying to decide what the remedies and the obligations of 
27 the parties are, and we're trying to do that, again, by 
28 virtue of that breach. For that reason, I think we're 
29 entitled to fees. 
20 Your Honor, I will briefly^speak to the other 
22 motion. We filed a motion for a summary judgment with 
22 respect to deficiency of $921.70. I asked for attorney's 
23 fees relative to that of $300, if I didn't have to attend 
24 I the hearing on this matter. I was handed at the commencement 
25 of this hearing, a check for $921.70, which is the principal 
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1 obligation owing, it does not include interest, it does not 
2 include any attorney's fees. I think we 1re entitled to at 
3 least a nominal amount of attorney's fees on that—that 
4 issue. 
5 We have not ever received a voluntary payment from 
6 the defendants. We've had to file motions for summary 
7 judgment every time we have requested a deficiency. 
8 Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Any response? 
10 MR. RAY: If I might, your Honor, and 
U I'll try and be brief. 
12 THE COURT: Let m e — l e t me ask you, the 
23 J last question, Counsel, o r — o r question that came up in 
24 response to the last statement. 
25 Is—and I'm not impugning Mr. Poole's truthfulness; 
26 but do you agree that your client has never made a voluntary 
17 payment under this judgment t o — t o the trust? 
28 I MR. RAY: I think if I could explain the 
29 j history o f — o f what's happened and that's—that is partly 
20 J the reason for this motion, your Honor. 
2i I Earlier this year, our client received a couple of 
22 I statements from the property manager and in response, sent 
23 I letters to the property manager requesting additional 
| documentation. Our client didn't receive the documentation 
it requested. Ultimately, there was correspondence and I 
I 17 
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believe one conversation between my client and Mr. Poole 
directly, and my client felt that it was simply an accounting 
matter, and that he could address it directly with Emily 
Walker Trust. Emily Walker Trust wanted all communications 
to go through Mr. Poole. 
My client requested, I believe, an affidavit from 
the property manager on the payment of rent and some 
additional documentation and wanted to basically set up a 
procedure so that there wouldn't be controversies. All of 
this took several months and resulted, finally, in the 
initial motion for summary judgment that was filed by 
Mr. Poole, I believe about four months ago. 
When that motion was filed, then it was resolved 
by the payment of a check. I don't believe it was—we ever 
even needed to file a responsive memorandum on that, but it 
arose out of what our client felt was not receiving the 
documentation it needed to assure itself as to exactly 
what was being paid and received under the lease, so that 
they could determine their obligation. 
This latest motion, again, my client just tells me 
that he hadn'tj received any statements from the property 
manager as to these amounts of past due rent. For the last 
couple of weeks, there is—Sparks, if I'm correct, is in the 
process of liquidation and has to get checks from another— 
from the parent corporation. And there was some confusion 
18 
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as to when that check was sent and ultimately, we just cut 
it directly from my law firm to Mr. Poole; but we would have 
paid those amounts if we felt that we had received the 
documentation that would have indicated to us exactly what 
had been paid. And I believe my client has indicated that 
he did not receive that documentation. 
Again, the payments of those amounts is—is—at 
this point, the difference is really rather minor, and it's 
not that Sparks thinks because it's minor it's not goincr to 
do it, but rather, because it's minor, they wouldn't have 
any incentive not to be doing it, and to be getting them-
selves in trouble with the Court by thumbing their nose at 
the judgment. And that certainly hasn't been their intent 
in—in what they've been doing. 
Some of the things that Mr. Poole stated, I 
believe point up the—the fact that the remedy which the 
defendants are suggesting would be more efficient and would 
be fairer to the parties and preserve both parties' 
interest. 
If we're continually coming back in here every 
six months contesting commercial reasonableness, I believe 
it's inefficient. The procedure which we have established 
would put the burdens on us, while still preserving the 
landlord's right to control the use of the property, to 
control the tenant's conduct out of the premises. All—all 
19 
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we're really concerned with is that the tenant is out there 
paying his full rent and paying his CAM charges and if they 
want to evict the tenant because he's all of a sudden 
changed his business or, you know, is—is trashing the place, 
that's—that would be a right that would be retained by the 
landlord. 
Our—what we're interested in is a monetary 
default in pursuing the tenant in the event of a monetary 
default or in the event of an eviction, being able to work 
with the landlord and directly with the joint broker in 
terms of putting somebody back in there and paying the—the 
brokerage fee directly. 
I believe also some of the concerns we have arise 
from the fact that—that for instance, there is a new 
substitute tenant out there, and we haven't seen the new 
lease with the substitute tenant and I'm not sure if we really 
even know who all of the current occupants of those 
premises are, and so it's those kinds of things that—that 
have registered or created the concerns in the defendants' 
mind and their interest in preserving the residual rights 
they have and in establishina a more efficiency mechanism. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. POOLE: Your Honor, may I make one 
brief statement? 
20 
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1 THE COURT: You may. 
2
 MR. POOLE: With respect to the calcula-
3 tion of this rental deficiency, Mr. Wanca has the same 
4 documents I have. He has the Gasperini leasef he has the 
5
 Sparks Maaco lease, it's a simple computation. He's known 
6
 for, at least the trial, what the amount of the deficiency 
7
 would be on a monthly basis. He can compute it as easily as 
8 I can. 
9
 I Thank you. 
MR. R A Y : May I speak to that? 
11
 I We do know what the monthly deficiency is, but we 
12 don't know what's actually being paid, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Well, let me make some 
14 comments here. 
15 I—I can see the appeal, particularly from the 
16 I defendants' point of view, of the proposed arrangement, 
whether it's an assignment or some type of greater ability 
to control and be sure that the income is being received from 
the premises. 
20
 | And I can even see some benefits to the—to the 
21 J owner, the plaintiff in this case, based on they have no 
22 I further responsibility to pay for the brokeracre fees for a 
lease being—if they have to procure a new tenant, and some 
24 I of the other problems. 
25 J on the other hand, it seems to me that the general 
21 
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principle of landlord and tenant law that we're dealing with 
here says that when the tenant's been—when a tenancy's been 
terminated, the landlord gets his premises back and the 
landlord then has the duty to mitigate; but you've got to 
keep in mind that in a rather bitterly contested lawsuit 
here, the side that prevailed was the tenant—or was the 
landlord. 
There obviously are not and will not be good 
feelings between these parties, and it seems to me that the 
duty to mitigate excludes just—just by the way that it's 
defined as operating in landlord and tenant cases, excludes 
the land—the tenant having anything other than a right to 
determine that the property's been leased in a commercially 
reasonable fashion and that the landlord is pursuing all of 
the things that a landlord has to pursue in order to reason-
ably mitigate its damages. That's the landlord's obligation 
and the expectation and right of the defaulting tenant. 
But it seems to me that that is a far cry from 
placing upon the landlord the duty of entering back into an 
arrangement whereby a tenant that is in default and has been 
so held to be and has been removed from the premises is back 
in effect, in control of the premises and dealing directly 
with the person that that tenant puts in possession and 
making determinations as to, particularly in a—in a mall 
or a strip mall-type operation, the—the very questions that 
22 
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are—that are vital to the owner; that is as some of those 
that Mr. Poole mentioned, the disposition of waste or waste 
upon the premises in a legal sense, the type of operation 
being carried on in that premises, the quality of the tenant 
in all of the—in all of the applications of that term, 
"quality", cleanliness, people that don't disrupt the opera-
tion of the rest of the—of the shopping center, not only bv 
reason of their business, but by the way they carry it on; 
all kinds of things, reliability, do they lock the place up 
at night, do they work at—after hours, do they have a 
tendency to cheat and fudge on rules and regulations or do 
they simply ignore them and are constantly a source of 
problem. 
It seems to me that you build right back into the 
relationship between the parties some of the exact problems 
that they had before, and I don't think that the concept of 
the landlord-tenant relationship, after a tenant has found— 
been found to be in default and is removed from the premises 
and the duty of the landlord to mitigate includes the tenant 
having the kinds of rights that are urged here. 
Secondly, even if it did, I think the question 
about the financial part of this is premature. The landlord 
clearly has a duty to mitigate, and the landlord clearly 
has a duty to provide to the defaulting tenant information 
which will give that information—or give that tenant a 
23 
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! correct, honest and rather prompt picture of what the status 
2 of that lease is and that if the tenant then has concerns 
3 that can be articulated and are legally enforceable about 
4 the fact the tenant—the landlord isn't meeting his or her 
5 obligation, or its obligation, to mitigate, that those 
6 issues can thus be raised. 
7 Now, I recognize that that is not as convenient 
8 or as easy as the proposal that1 s —that 1 s —that- s mentioned, 
9 and I'm not saying that the proposal as mentioned is not a 
10 w a Y t o 9° u n der certain circumstances; but I am saying that 
n I don't think that the landlord in this case is legally 
12 I obligated to enter into that kind of arrangement and that's 
13 in effect what is being asked here of the Court, is to 
14 require the landlord to do so. 









premature at this point. If the situation with the Gasperinis 
!7 for instance, or any other tenant fell apart for no reason 
of the landlord's and our economic situation in this 
29 community went to pot like it did for the last 15 years 
until all of a sudden we had this wonderful economic boom, 
it could be that for the rest of the term of this lease, 
that—that there would be a — a flat negative flow in there 
from no fault of the—of the landlord's. 
On the other hand, if the landlord, through its 
own fault, negligent or otherwise, failed to keep a tenant 
24 
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that could and would and should pay increases, then in that 
























that mitigation question. 
Now, I'm not making a ruling at this moment 
because, again, I think it's premature as to whether any 
future excesses or surplusages in those rental payments 
should be—be credited against past deficiencies. If they 
should and—and I'm—and I'm not sure that they shouldn't, 
I'm just ruling on that issue; but assuming they should, 
what the tenant would have us do now is hold those in 
arrearage in anticipation of the upcoming surplusage and then 
apply it back. The same effect is—the same result is 
affected except that the landlord at this point is entitled 
to their rental now, as if the tenant were in place and— 
and not obligated to have—to wait and you say, no Counsel, 
they're not obligated to wait? 
MR. POOLE: No. It's— 
MR. RAY: No, we're n o t — 
THE COURTi Oh, all right. All right. 
Okay. 
MR. RAY: We're not seeking excesses 
right now, only when—when and as they're paid. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, when and as 
they're paid, this is not a ruling, it's not even an 
advisory ruling, maybe I shouldn't even say it, but it's, 
25 
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1 at this point, is my general understanding, that they 
2 probably are entitled—the tenantfs probably entitled to 
3 those. And in effect, that becomes a reimbursement for any 
4 surplus—or any defects—any—any shortage that's up right 
5 now, but I'm not going to rule on that issue. I think that 
6 issue has to be brought before the Court when and if that 
7 in fact becomes a justiciable issue. And in that event, 
8 then of course, we'll have it briefed to the Court, then 
9 we'll have a look at it at that time. 
10 So, I'm going to deny the—the motion for the 
U J assignment. I recognize that it may lead to future litiga-
22 I tion, and I don't encourage that, and I know that that's 












requested, but I don't think it trods upon the landlord's 
15 legal rights as the requested assignment would, and I don't 
think I can do that. 
As far as the attorney's fees for this is concerned, 
for this motion, I'm going to deny them at this time, 
Mr. Poole. I think that we can say i t — i t rises out of 
the lease, but I think that the lease, in effect, was 
terminated and over as of the time that the Court rendered 
its judgment in this case and the time for appeal ran. 
Therefore, at this point, I think we're working on post-
remedy-—or post-judgment remedies which are not affected by 
the terras of the—of the lease, but are affected by the 
26 
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2 Now, as to your motion for summary judgment, that 
3 related to the arrearage. Well, you don't need that at this 
4 point, that's moot. I'm going t o — 
5 MR* POOLE: Assuming the check clears, 
6 I have no reason to believe it wouldn't. 
7 THE COURT: No. You have no reason to 
8 believe i t — 
9 MR. POOLE: That it would not. 
10 THE COURT: —would not, veah. At this 
H point, I'm not going to award attorney's fees on that one, 
22 either; but I am going to say this to the landlord—or to the 
tenant: With the history that we've had here, assuming that 
the—the landlord will provide adequate information to 
determine a question of arrearage and occupancy and the 
IQ I things that you have a right to know, or your client has a 
yi right to know, under its—under the landlord's duty to 
18 mitigate and under your client's duty to pay anything that 
19 can't be mitigated, assuming you get that information 
20 adequately and promptly, if we have back before us again 
2i another question of collection of those amounts based upon 
22 they just aren't paid when due, the Court's going to have a 
23 good, hard look at attorney's fees. 
MR. WANCA: I understand that, your Honor. 
If I could address the Court very briefly on that issue. 
27 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I — 
2 MR. WANCA: I — 1 ~ 
3 T H E COURT: I'm not granting them at 
4 this point• 
5 MR* WANCA: No. I just want the Court 
6 to know I don't know t h i n k — w e — w e put on evidence to that 
7 effect, but I wrote the managing agent in January of this 
8 year requesting that information; I didn't get it. Six 
9 weeks later, I got a letter from Mr. Poole, which I asked 
10 him for that information once again and rather than aive it 
H to me, he provided it as for—as part of his motion for 
12 summary judgment. We c o u l d — w e — w e didn't need to be here 
13 if we got that information. 
14 THE COURT: Well, that's--
25 MR. WANCA: That's our position. 
16 THE COURT: That's one of the reasons 
yi is at this point I understand there's some dispute about 
!8 that, and that's why I'm not going to award any attorney's 
19 I fees and costs at this time. But I am saying that if we 
20 have this kind of a dispute in the future, the Court's going 
2i to award fees and costs on such side as it finds to be, in 
22 effect, dilatory in this matter, because that tends to 
23 reduce litigation, and that's what we want to do. 
MR. WANCA: I don't want to be back here, 
THE COURT: All right. I would suggest 
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25 
that if the—if the landlord •TnTmTTT"""!" I 1 1 a lnsists that you deal through 
Mr. Poole, that you deal with Mr. Poole and save the time of 
3 I running through the managing-the property manager, if m 
( fact that's what they want to do, 
5 | MR- W A N C A- If that's what they want, 
, then, they can.pay his fees. 
6 
7 | T H E C 0 U R T : Yeah. if thev don't, then 
that's fine, too. But either way, Mr. Poole, I would r e — 
I would think you ought to advise your client that the 
Court has made this ruling that the information be supplied— 
excuse me—promptly, if your client wants prompt payment. 
MR. POOLE: We have no objection to 
providing that information. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Poole, will 
you prepare an appropriate order? 
MR. POOLE: I will. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. POOLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess until 
the 10:30 calendar. 
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